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ME Or NOT ME aS SOurCE OF iNGrOup FavOriTiSM aNd OuTGrOup dErOGaTiON: a CONNECTiONiST pErSpECTivE
Tim vanhoomissen and frank van overwalle Vrije Universiteit Brussel
This article proposes an extension of the connectionist analysis of group biases by van Rooy et al. (2003) to provide a more parsimonious account for ingroup favoritism as caused by self-anchoring (i.e., projecting features of the self in defining the ingroup) and to test the novel hypothesis that outgroup derogation is caused by self-competition (i.e., using opposite features of the self for defining the outgroup). moreover, our connectionist account predicts that these two effects are more pronounced under conditions of self-priming that render characteristics of the self more accessible. Two experiments using minimal groups demonstrate (a) that ingroup favoritism is due to self-anchoring or the projection of self features in the ingroup, (b) that outgroup derogation is a direct consequence of self-competition (i.e., contrasting away from the self) rather than of contrasting away from the ingroup, (c) that self-priming (by making self-evaluations first) leads to more pronounced evaluation of the self, and to more contrastive evaluation of the ingroup and outgroup. A connectionist simulation in which these predictions are simulated shows a large overlap with the experimental data, supporting our connectionist perspective. The discussion centers on other predictions based on a connectionist approach of group categorization.
The concept of ingroup favoritism has a century-old history in social psychology. When Sumner proposed the term ethnocentrism in 1906 to define positive feelings toward the ingroup, he claimed that these feelings of pride and superiority were inseparably correlated with negative feelings toward the outgroup. Since then, researchers in social psychology have attempted to gain a better understanding of the processes underlying ethnocentrism, social discrimination and prejudice and, although some authors (e.g., Allport, 1954) doubted that there was a direct connection between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, the accepted consensus was-at least implicitly-that these two phenomena were interrelated (Brewer, 1999) .
More recently, social psychologists emphasized the role of the individual self in ingroup favoritism and proposed alternative mechanisms for this effect. According to some researchers (Clement & Krueger, 2002; Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001 ), ingroup favoritism is often the consequence of a strong association between the ingroup and a positive self image. In this view, the self description is deeply encoded and highly accessible, and therefore provides crucial input to shape the ingroup's prototype. Given that most people's self-evaluation is highly positive (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2001 ), this process can in itself sufficiently account for ingroup favoritism. Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) called this process of generalizing the positive self image to the ingroup self-anchoring, while other researchers termed this self-as-information-base (Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001) or social projection (Clement & Krueger, 2002) . This stands in contrast to the classical view from social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) which proposes the reverse process whereby the self is dehumanized when group boundaries become salient, and characteristics of the ingroup provide input to define the self. Besides this disagreement, both theoretical positions seem to agree on a second, separate process of differentiation whereby people tend to distinguish their ingroup from their outgroup by inferring opposite characteristics to both groups. Although some researchers questioned the assumption that outgroup derogation is a direct consequence of ingroup favoritism or vice versa (e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) , in this view the favoritism by which the ingroup is treated will consequently lead to derogation of the outgroup.
The goal of the present research is to provide a more parsimonious theoretical account of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. This account is based on the broader framework of connectionist processing and principles, and does not need separate social categorization mechanisms to explain the effects of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. In order to do so, we replicate some basic findings on self-anchoring, but also propose and test a novel prediction with respect to outgroup derogation. Before introducing our theoretical account, we first describe the empirical research on which the self-anchoring explanation has been based, and which provides the starting point for our approach. Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) provided the initial evidence for self-anchoring. In a series of experiments, they assigned participants to a minimal ingroup and provided them with specific trait information about the novel ingroup or outgroup. Participants then evaluated the group that was not described and the self on the same traits. Results showed that self ratings were more similar to ingroup than outgroup ratings, indicating that self-anchoring-generalization of the self to the ingroup-had taken place. In contrast, outgroup ratings seemed to rely on a differentiation process in which the outgroup traits were contrasted away from the ingroup information. Further support for the self-anchoring account came from an order effect. Self-anchoring was stronger when the self was evaluated at the beginning of the evaluation tasks rather than at the end. That is, ingroup ratings were most positive when they were given immediately after self-evaluations. This indicates that when characteristics of the self were made more salient and more directly available, their defining impact on the ingroup became even stronger.
These results were supported by Otten and her colleagues (Otten, 2004; Otten & Epstude, 2006; Otten & Wentura, 2001 ) who showed the typical ingroup favoritism effect and a large impact of the self on ingroup descriptions. Importantly, they also demonstrated that the reverse impact of an earlier description of the ingroup on self descriptions was negligible (Otten & Epstude, 2006) , casting doubt on the classic view that the ingroup provides input to the self. This confirmed their claim of "self-anchoring as the crucial basis for ingroup favoritism" (Otten & Wentura, 2001, p. 525) . In a review, Robbins and Krueger (2005) also concluded that there is convincing support for the self-anchoring effect. It was found that the effect is stronger for laboratory groups than for real groups. Furthermore, the authors concluded that projection of the self to the ingroup was stronger than any positive self projection to the outgroup. In contrast to Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) , however, this review found no effects of the order of evaluations.
a CONNECTiONiST MOdEl OF CaTEGOrizaTiON EFFECTS
In this article, we propose a connectionist account of the self-anchoring effect in the minimal group paradigm based on the model that has been successfully applied earlier to explain group biases by Van Rooy, Van Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, and French (2003) . The connectionist approach has been applied in several areas of social cognition, not only in group stereotyping (e.g., Kashima, Woolcock, & Kashima, 2000; Van Rooy et al., 2003) but also in person impression formation (Kashima & Kerekes, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004) and attitude formation (Eiser, Fazio, Stafford, & Prescott, 2003; Eiser, Stafford, & Fazio, 2008; Monroe & Read, 2008; Van Overwalle & Heylighen, 2006; Van Overwalle & Jordens, 2002; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005 ; for an overview, see Van Overwalle, 2007) . The present approach is similar to the connectionist framework of ingroup favoritism and self-ingroup overlap developed by Smith, Coats, and Walling (1999) , although it exploits more powerful properties of connectionist modeling. In particular, while the model by Smith et al. (1999) provides no possibilities for learning, our connectionist approach allows learning and self-organization. This reflects a view of the mind as an adaptive mechanism that develops a mental representation of social categories to which an individual exemplar (e.g., the self) may belong or not. Learning is modeled as a process of online adaptation of existing exemplar and category knowledge to novel information about the self or the social environment.
Crucially, learning in a connectionist model can explain self-anchoring and outgroup derogation as properties naturally emerging from this process. This provides a more parsimonious theoretical account of categorization effects in line with the broader field of cognitive learning, without recourse to idiosyncratic or ad-hoc mechanisms and hypotheses that exist only in the domain of social categorization. To illustrate, Van Rooy et al. (2003) demonstrated that connectionist principles go a long way in explaining previous findings on group biases such as illusory correlation, accentuation, subtyping, and group homogeneity without invoking new processing principles and without invoking higher-order controlled processes that steer these effects. In a similar manner, we want to emphasize the richness of the connectionist approach-given some reasonable boundary conditions-to explain earlier and present findings on self-anchoring and to propose a novel prediction with respect to outgroup derogation. As such, the connectionist view provides a bridging function between basic cognitive processes uncovered in other domains of psychology and categorization processes in social psychology.
THE bAsIC modEL
Before we go on, it is necessary to introduce the connectionist model briefly by describing its architecture (how information is represented in the model) and learning algorithm (how information is processed in the model). After that, we describe the properties of the model that explain categorization effects. Figure 1 depicts the generic architecture of the model used by Van Rooy et al. (2003) , a recurrent or auto-associative connectionist network (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988 ). This generic model is also applied for the current topic. Each unit in the figure represents a single symbolic concept, such as a person, a group, or a category of traits (i.e., localist representation). All these units are interconnected with each other: they all can send and receive activation. To represent the experimental conditions from earlier research (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Otten & Wentura, 2001 ), we use two kinds of units. First, the targets of evaluation are represented each by a single unit: the self, the ingroup, and the outgroup. As can be seen, a plausible but crucial assumption is that the self is part of the ingroup. Second, the evaluation of the targets on the basis of trait ratings is represented by two trait units that summarize all positive and negative trait information. The weight of the connections between each target and trait reflects the strength of the positive or negative evaluation of the targets. All these target→trait connections are depicted in the figure.
How are the weights of these connections developed? When information is provided from external sources, the activation of each relevant unit in the network is turned on (set to +1), and this activation is spread throughout the network in proportion to the weights of the connections. Next, the activation received from the outside sources is compared with the short-term activation generated in the network (which represents the prediction of the network). Any errors or differences between these two activation levels lead to long-term weight changes of the connections in order to provide better predictions on the actual state of the external environment next time. This adjusting mechanism is known as the delta learning algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988 ; see appendix for mathematical details). The delta learning algorithm has important properties that explain the categorization effects of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (including order effects of self evaluation).
often positive (or negative) trait information is paired with a group, the stronger the connection between the corresponding positive (or negative) trait and the group becomes. This property explains the typical ingroup favoritism effect. When a positive trait is repeatedly presented with the self, this leads to an increasing self→positive trait connection weight. In the same way, when a negative trait is repeatedly presented with the self, this is consolidated in an increasing self→negative trait weight (for an example, see Simulation 1 on illusory correlation by Van Rooy et al., 2003) . Since people tend to strive to maintain a highly positive evaluation of the self (Alicke et al., 1995; Koole et al., 2001) , we assume that participants actively search out or remember more positive information about the self, and tend to eschew negative information about the self. Consequently, people typically have stronger connection weights linking the self with positive traits than with negative traits.
To explain the effect of self-anchoring, we simply have to assume that the self is the most important member of the ingroup on whom the individual observer has most accessible information, so that information about the self is most dominant and strongly determines the evaluation of the ingroup. When the group is novel or unknown-as is typically the case in a minimal group paradigm-then the self is even the only member effectively known of the ingroup. Consequently, the positive self image, represented by the strong self→positive trait connection, will dominate the evaluation of the ingroup, by spreading activation from the self to the positive traits when judging the ingroup.
To explain the greater impact of self-anchoring when self traits are evaluated first (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) , we simply have to assume that self-evaluation acts as self-priming. Starting the evaluation sequence with self ratings will (at least temporarily) activate the self, and this will reinforce the self→trait connections befIgURE 1. The recurrent connectionist model applied on self-anchoring and ingroup favoritism. Three target units represent the self, the ingroup and the outgroup, while two trait units represent positive and negative traits. The self is drawn within the ingroup to emphasize its central role in the ingroup and to indicate that it is always activated whenever the ingroup is activated. Although two-headed arrows are used to avoid cluttering up the figure, in the network each direction of an arrow actually represents a different connection weight.
Trait units
Target units self ingroup outgroup positive negative cause of the greater exposure (i.e., sample size effect described above). As a consequence, this increases categorization effects like ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.
oUTgRoUP dERogATIoN As AN EmERgENT CoNsEqUENCE of ComPETITIoN
Another feature of the delta learning algorithm is competition between connections when multiple units predict the activation of another unit. The competition property produces effects similar to discounting in causal attribution (Kelley, 1972) . The mechanism underlying competition is related to associative learning effects such as blocking, overshadowing and superconditioning from the well-known classical conditioning literature and are often explained in terms of the associative learning model developed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972) which is equivalent to the delta learning algorithm. This competition principle predicts that when one stimulus already accurately predicts an effect through a strong stimulus→effect connection, then the development of additional connections of other stimuli with the effect are blocked. The reason is that the accurate prediction from the strong stimulus→effect connection leaves no error in the system, so that no further learning takes place. Because delta learning is driven by error correction, if there is no error there is no weight change. Based on this competition mechanism, we make the novel prediction that the self contributes not only to ingroup favoritism, but also to outgroup derogation. How do we explain this? In our model, competition arises between the self and the outgroup in predicting positive traits, that is, between the self→positive traits connection and the outgroup→positive traits connection. Since the self→positive traits connection is very strong due to a positive self-image, this accurately predicts the positive trait expectation already by itself, and this tends to block the development of an additional outgroup→positive traits connection. In contrast, in the case of a negative trait, the self→negative traits connection is relatively weak so that this will result in little blocking of an outgroup→negative traits connection. Taken together, greater blocking of a positive outgroup evaluation and less blocking of a negative outgroup evaluation leads to a negative outgroup image overall (for a related example, see Simulation 4 on subtyping by Van Rooy et al., 2003) . Since the ingroup is the more salient entity (as the self is part of it) and because the competition property only begins to exert its effect when the self→positive connection is sufficiently strong, we expect the effects of self-competition and outgroup derogation to be smaller than that of self-anchoring.
In sum, we predict that the property of competition leads to a reversed relationship between evaluations of the self and outgroup. This novel hypothesis is termed the self-competition hypothesis. It is important to note that the self-competition hypothesis sees outgroup derogation as primarily caused by a competitive relationship with the self, and not by a competitive relationship with the ingroup as implied in earlier theoretical accounts in terms of differentiation or oppositeness mechanism (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Clement & Krueger, 2002; Otten, 2002) , optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1999) , accentuation (Eiser, 1971; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) or meta-contrast (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . The present self-competition explanation does not need an a priori negative link between ingroup and outgroup either. Taken together, our explanation is routed in the larger framework of associative/connectionist learning and therefore provides a more parsimonious account for categorization effects than earlier approaches.
prESENT rESEarCh
The aim of this research was to explore (a) the self-anchoring hypothesis with respect to ingroup favoritism, (b) the novel self-competition hypothesis with respect to outgroup derogation, and (c) the causal role of the self in these two hypotheses through a self-priming manipulation (by changing the order of self-evaluation). Our experiments were largely based on the paradigms of Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) and Otten and Wentura (2001) in which participants rated several traits of the self, ingroup, and outgroup. However, a limitation of this research is that a single dichotomous rating scale was used, where a high score for the ingroup automatically meant a low score for the outgroup. Of course, this type of scale forces participants to contrast ingroup ratings against outgroup ratings, while the purpose of our experiments is to explore whether such contrastive evaluations between groups are spontaneously made. Hence, to separate the processes leading to ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, we included separate evaluations for the ingroup as well as for the outgroup.
To test our hypotheses, we used the same kind of intraindividual regression analyses as proposed by Otten and Wentura (2001) . These researchers calculated profiles of the trait evaluations and computed correlations between them (see also Method section). They found that profile correlations between an individual's self-ratings and ingroup-ratings reliably predicted ingroup favoritism. Based on the self-anchoring hypothesis, we predict that the evaluation of the self will be a significant predictor for a similar ingroup evaluation (see also Otten & Wentura, 2001 ). Based on our novel self-competition hypothesis, we predict that self evaluation has a reverse relationship with outgroup evaluation. However, since we expect self-competition to be asymmetric and most evident for positive self-traits only (as most participants have highly positive self evaluations to compete against), a profile analysis is less adequate (as it assumes symmetry) and may only reveal slightly negative correlations. Therefore, to test our self-competition hypothesis more appropriately, we need to distinguish between high and low self traits and analyze our self-competition predictions separately on each of them.
To test the causal role of the self in creating ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, we explored the effect of self-priming by varying the order of the selfevaluation procedure. The sample-size property predicts that the two effects of self-anchoring and of self-competition will be stronger when the self is evaluated (i.e., primed) at the beginning of the experiment rather than at the end of the experiment.
ExpEriMENT 1
Due to the stronger self→positive traits connection than the self→negative traits connection, we expect for positive traits a somewhat stronger effect of self-anchoring and self-competition. Therefore, in order to maximize our chances at finding support for our hypotheses, this first experiment uses only positive traits. The second experiment will use negative traits.
mETHod
Participants. Forty-eight male and female participants, aged from 18 to 22 years participated in the experiment. All participants were undergraduate students at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and participated in return for course credit. Three participants were removed from the analyses because they did not comply with the instructions. Specifically, reaction times of less than 700 ms were registered, in combination with undifferentiated scale midpoint responses on all trait items. One participant was excluded from analysis because he participated in a minimal group experiment before. All participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (minimal ingroup) X 2 (self-priming) between subjects design of this study.
Materials. Participants rated 20 positive traits. Ten traits came from the study by Otten and Wentura (2001) and were translated into Dutch. Another ten distinct positive traits were selected from the "Idioticon van de persoonlijkheid" (Doddema-Winsemius & De Raad, 1997) which is a Big Five classification of Dutch trait adjectives. Participants also completed a self-esteem measure (Rosenberg, 1965) which was translated into Dutch. The experiment was programmed using the Eprime software and run on Pentium IV PCs with 17-inch color monitors.
Procedure.
A maximum number of 8 participants per session came to the laboratory. They were seated in separate cubicles in front of the computer, and the instructions appeared on the computer screen. The procedure used a typical Minimal Group design and was very similar to the procedure by Otten and Wentura (2001) .
First, in order to assign participants to different ingroups, they completed a reaction time task in which they had to indicate as quickly as possible if the second and fourth letter in a block of five letters were the same. One hundred trials were run. At the end, false feedback on the reaction time results was given, indicating that the participant had a typical "convex" (or "concave") profile. Also, a description of the categories "convex" and "concave" was provided. It was told that "convex" people tend to have shorter reaction times in the middle of the reaction time task, whereas "concave" people show shorter reaction times at the beginning and the end of the task. The participants were then informed that the research aimed to investigate which personality traits were correlated with being a "convex" or "concave" person.
In the self-priming condition, participants were first asked to answer the ten items of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. In addition, participants took a self rating, in which they were asked to rate themselves on each of the 20 traits on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (does not apply at all to me) to 7 (does completely apply to me). They then rated the same traits for their ingroup (convex or concave) and the outgroup (concave or convex respectively). Before rating the ingroup or the outgroup, they were encouraged to use their spontaneously emerging image of both categories of people. In the no self-priming condition, the same ratings had to be completed, but in another sequence: participants first took the ingroup rat-ing, followed by the outgroup rating, Rosenberg's self-esteem measure, and the self rating.
At the end of the experiment, as a manipulation check, participants were asked to indicate which category they belonged to, based on the reaction-time feedback they received at the beginning of the experiment. All participants correctly remembered their category label.
REsULTs
Because there was no significant effect of the assigned minimal ingroup "convex" or "concave" on any of the dependent variables, data were collapsed across this variable.
Intraindividual Regression Analysis. Following Otten and Wentura (2001) , intraindividual regression analyses were calculated for each participant with the 20 self ratings on the positive traits as predictor and the ingroup and outgroup ratings on the same traits as dependent variables. The rationale for this analysis is that it allows detecting similarities in the rating profiles between the self and the other groups. According to Otten and Wentura (2001) , this is a more appropriate analysis than a simple correlational analysis, and therefore better suited to test our selfanchoring predictions.
The individual regression beta weights were subjected to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Self-Priming (prime vs. no prime) as between-participants factor and Target (ingroup or outgroup) as a within-participants factor. An uninteresting main effect of Self-Priming was found: the beta weights were smaller in the self-priming condition (M = 0.19, SD = 0.19) than in the no priming condition (M = 0.38, SD = 0.19), F(1, 45) = 14.75, p < .001. More importantly for our hypothesis, there was a main effect of Target revealing that the beta regression weights for the ingroup were positive and significantly larger (M = 0.69, SD = 0.16) than the slightly negative beta weights for the outgroup (M = -0.12, SD = 0.22), F(1, 45) = 139.46, p < .001. This supports the self-anchoring hypothesis that the rating profiles of the self were more similar to the ingroup than to the outgroup.
The predicted Self-Priming X Target interaction approached significance, F(1, 45) = 3.12, p = .08. As shown in Figure 2 , there was a significant difference in the beta weights for the outgroup. In the priming condition, the beta weight was lower (M = -.28, SD = 0.22) than in the no priming condition (M = .04, SD = 0.22), F(1, 45) = 8.49, p < .01, indicating that after self-priming, the rating profiles of the outgroup became more distinct from the self. In contrast, for the ingroup there was no significant difference in the beta weights between priming (M = .65, SD = 0.17) and no priming (M = .73, SD = 0.15), F(1, 45) = 1.98, p = .17. Thus, contrary to our expectations, the self-priming manipulation was effective only on outgroup derogation, and not on ingroup favoritism. Additional descriptive statistics suggest that a ceiling effect may explain the absence of this effect. The skewness of the distribution of beta weights for the ingroup was -1.18, which indicates that most beta scores are grouped together at the positive extreme (close to +1) and only a few ones at the negative extreme (close to -1).
Median Split Analysis. In order to test whether the slightly negative beta weights for the outgroup were due to self-competition, we performed an additional median split analysis. A dummy variable coded the position of each participant's self rating in comparison with the overall median self rating. All responses above the median were dummy-coded "high," while all responses below the median were dummy-coded "low." Next, an ANOVA was performed with Self-Priming as between-participants factor and Self-Position (high vs. low) and Target (self, ingroup and outgroup) as within-participants factors. We predicted that the increased priming of high self ratings will lead to discounting of the outgroup ratings, while increased priming of low self ratings may, or may not have an opposite effect.
A main effect of Target was found, F(2, 1382) = 10.11, p < .001. As might be expected, the self (M = 4.81) was rated higher than the outgroup (M = 4.56), F(1, 691) = 13.07, p < .001; and the ingroup (M = 4.68) was rated higher than the outgroup, F(1, 691) = 18.11, p < .001. Results also suggest that the self was rated higher than the ingroup, but this effect only approached significance, F(1, 691) = 3.29, p = .08.
In agreement with the self-anchoring and self-competition hypotheses, the interaction of Target and Self-Position proved significant, F(2, 1384) = 395.63, p < .001. Contrast analyses showed that the ingroup was rated higher for high self traits (M = 5.65) than for low self traits (M = 3.72), F(1, 691) = 669.71, p < .001, supporting the self-anchoring hypothesis of ingroup favoritism. In contrast, and more importantly, the outgroup scores were lower for high self traits (M = 4.43) than for low self traits (M = 4.69), F(1, 691) = 6.50, p = .01. This supports the self-competition hypothesis of outgroup derogation.
In support of the causal effect of self-priming, we also found the predicted triple interaction of Target, Self-Position and Self-Priming, F(2, 1384) = 10.49, p < .001. The means are shown in Table 1 . First, contrast analyses were conducted for the ingroup ratings. For high self traits, we found that the ingroup was rated lower in the priming condition (M = 5.51) than in the no priming condition (M = 5.79), F(1, 691) = 6.20, p = .01. This seems to suggest that there is a small, but reliable selfcompetition effect against the ingroup. For low self traits, there was no significant difference between the priming (M = 3.79) and no priming condition (M = 3.66), F(1, 691) = 1.82, p = .18. Next, to test our self-competition prediction of outgroup derogation, the same contrasts were calculated for the outgroup ratings. For high self traits, the outgroup was rated lower in the priming condition (M = 4.16) than in the no priming condition (M = 4.69), F(1, 691) = 11.04, p < .001. In contrast, for low self traits, the outgroup was rated higher in the priming condition (M = 4.95) than in the no priming condition (M = 4.43), F(1, 691) = 14.61, p < .001. Thus, as expected, self-priming produced an inverse effect between self ratings and outgroup ratings, and so aggravated outgroup derogation. Unexpectedly, we also found an effect of self-priming on the ingroup, in that increased awareness of the self also caused some degree of derogation of the ingroup. This effect was small and did not surface in the beta analysis.
dIsCUssIoN
We predicted that ingroup favoritism is driven by a generalization from a positive self image to the novel ingroup, based on a self-anchoring effect. We also predicted that self-anchoring and ingroup favoritism would be more pronounced after priming the self (by performing a self evaluation before the ingroup and outgroup evaluations). Our intraindividual regression analyses showed a significant self-anchoring effect, such that self evaluation was a significant predictor for the ingroup evaluation, but not for the outgroup evaluation. However, contrary to predictions, for the ingroup, there was no significant difference in the beta weights between self-priming and no self-priming. This is perhaps due to a ceiling effect, as the overlap between the self and the ingroup was already very high without priming.
We also made a novel prediction that outgroup derogation is a consequence of self-competition against the outgroup, and that this effect would become more pronounced after priming. Our intraindividual regression analyses indicated that the beta weights for the outgroup were lower after self-priming. A median split analysis further supported that outgroup derogation was due to self-competition. The outgroup was rated lower than the self and the ingroup, and the outgroup scores were especially lower for traits that received a high score for the self. This effect was even increased after self-priming. In contrast, the outgroup was rated higher for traits that received a low score for the self. This effect was also stronger after self-priming. Thus, consistent with the self-competition hypothesis, there is an inverse relationship between self and outgroup ratings, and this effect is strengthened after self-priming, supporting the causal role of self perception in this process. Unexpectedly, this same self-competition effect was observed for the ingroup, but only for high self traits. This unexpected and counterintuitive result shows that self-competition can also take place against the ingroup, but to a lesser degree than against the outgroup. Incidentally, this latter effect rules out the ingroup as primary source of outgroup derogation, because the means in both groups show a similar pattern of self-competition, and hence cannot give rise to differentiation between the two groups.
ExpEriMENT 2
Given that our main hypotheses were confirmed for positive traits, we now tested them for negative traits. As mentioned above, the connectionist framework predicts somewhat weaker self-anchoring and self-competition effects for negative traits. By testing our hypothesis also for negative traits, we can rule out an alternative explanation for self-anchoring in terms of the valence of the traits rather than their self-relevance (see also Otten & Wentura, 2001 ). Moreover, to exclude an alternative account in terms of direct competition between the ingroup and outgroup, we tested whether priming the ingroup (by evaluating the ingroup before the outgroup) would further enhance the predicted self-priming effect. Therefore, we included an extra condition, in which the order of the ingroup and outgroup evaluations was manipulated.
mETHod
Participants. Forty-seven male and female participants, aged from 18 to 45 years participated in the experiment. They were recruited through email and advertise- ments at the campus of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. All participants received a total of 10 euros for participation in this and two unrelated experiments. On the same grounds as in experiment 1, 10 participants were removed from the analyses because they did not comply with the instructions. All participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (minimal ingroup) X 2 (self-priming) X 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup priming) between-subjects design of this study.
Materials. The materials were identical to Experiment 1, except that participants now rated 18 negative traits. Ten traits came from the study by Otten & Wentura (2001) and were translated into Dutch. Another eight distinct negative traits were selected from the "Idioticon van de persoonlijkheid" (Doddema-Winsemius & De Raad, 1997).
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except for a different ingroup assigning procedure to generalize across ingroup assignment tasks. Also, an extra ingroup priming manipulation was introduced.
First, participants were assigned to different ingroups on the basis of a number estimation task. Forty trials showed different numbers of dots on the computer screen for 800 ms. On the basis of false feedback, the participants were told that they had a typical "vertical" profile. A description of the categories "vertical" and "horizontal" was provided. It was told that "vertical" people tend to estimate the number of dots more accurately when the dots "are organized vertically," whereas "horizontal" people are more accurate at estimating when the dots "are organized horizontally." The participants were then informed that the research aimed to investigate which personality traits were correlated with being a "vertical" or "horizontal" person.
Second, in addition to self-priming, there was now also priming of the ingroup and the outgroup. In the ingroup priming condition, participants first rated the same 18 traits for their ingroup (vertical) and then for their outgroup (horizontal). In the outgroup priming condition, they first rated the outgroup and then the ingroup.
REsULTs
In strong agreement with our novel self-competition hypothesis, we failed to find any significant effect of ingroup priming. This suggests that the self is a much more powerful source of outgroup derogation than the ingroup. Although the Group Priming factor was used in the statistical analyses for the sake of completeness (see below), it will be ignored further in the discussion of the results. Intraindividual Regression Analysis. The individual beta weights were subjected to an ANOVA with Self-Priming (prime vs. no prime) and Group Priming (ingroup vs. outgroup) as between-participants factors and Target (self, ingroup, or outgroup) as a within-participants factor. There was a main effect of Target showing that the beta weights were positive and significantly larger for the ingroup (M = 0.67, SD = 0.17) than the slightly negative beta weights for the outgroup (M = -0.12, SD = 0.22), F(1, 33) = 74.87, p < .001. This indicates that, consistent with the self-anchoring hypothesis, the rating profiles of the self were more similar to the ingroup than the outgroup. The predicted Self-Priming X Target interaction was also significant, F(1, 33) = 4.94, p = .03. As shown in Figure 3 , there was a significant difference in the beta weights for the outgroup. In the self-priming condition, the beta weights were lower (M = -.26, SD = .022) than in the no self-priming condition (M = .02, SD = 0.21), F(1, 33) = 3.46, p = .08, indicating that after self-priming, the rating profiles of the outgroup became more distinct from the self. In contrast, for the ingroup, there was no significant difference in the beta weights between self-priming (M = .73, SD = 0.16) and no self-priming (M = .61, SD = 0.18), F(1, 33) = 2.82, p = .10. Thus, like in Experiment 1, self-priming was effective only on outgroup derogation, and not on self-anchoring.
Median Split Analysis.
In order to test whether the differences in the beta weights for the outgroup were due to self-competition, we performed the same median split analysis as in Experiment 1, where "high" now means a high score for negative traits and "low" a low score for negative traits. The means are shown in Table  2 . The same ANOVA was performed as before, with Self-Position (high vs. low) as additional within-participants factor. Based on the rationale that strong (or "high") connections with the self lead to stronger self-competition against the outgroup, we predicted that the priming of high (negative) self ratings will lead to less (negative) ratings of the outgroup, while priming of low (negative) self ratings will have less effect. The most relevant results of this analysis are described next.
A main effect of Target was found. Within this effect, two contrasts were significant: the self was rated lower on negative traits (M = 3.30) than the outgroup (M = 3.78), F(1, 575) = 19.75, p < .001; and the ingroup (M = 3.39) was also rated lower on negative traits than the outgroup (M = 3.78), F(1, 575) = 37.31, p < .001.
In support of the self-anchoring and self-competition hypotheses, the interaction between Target and Self-Position proved again to be significant, F(2, 1150) = 368.57, p < .001. Contrast analyses showed that the ingroup was rated higher for high self traits (i.e., with a self rating score above the median; M = 4.47) than for low self traits (M = 2.31), F(1, 575) = 402.89, p < .001, supporting the self-anchoring explanation. More importantly, in contrast, the outgroup scores were lower for high self traits (M = 3.60) than for low self traits (M = 3.96), F(1, 575) = 6.78, p < .01. These latter results are consistent with our self-competition hypothesis for outgroup derogation.
In support of the causal role of the self, we also found the predicted triple interaction of Target, Self-Position, and Self-Priming, F(2, 1150) = 4.71, p = .009. Contrast analyses indicated that ratings for the ingroup were lower for high (negative) self traits in the self-priming condition (M = 4.20) than in the no self-priming condition (M = 4.74), F(1, 575) = 8.97, p < .01. Unexpectedly, ratings for the ingroup were also lower for low (negative) self traits in the self-priming condition (M = 2.08) than in the no self-priming condition (M = 2.53), F(1, 575) = 12.19, p < .01. Thus, an increased inverse relationship between self and ingroup was revealed after selfpriming only for high self ratings, not for low self ratings. Next, the same contrasts for the outgroup ratings revealed that given high (negative) self traits, the outgroup was rated lower on these ratings in the self-priming condition (M = 3.26) than in the no self-priming condition (M = 3.94), F(1, 575) = 11.31, p < .001. For low (negative) self traits, there was no significant difference between the self-priming condition (M = 4.07) and the no self-priming condition (M = 3.86), F(1, 575) = 1.16, p = .28. These results suggest that priming has a strong inverse effect on outgroup evaluation, especially on high ratings as predicted.
dIsCUssIoN
This experiment was conducted to explore the self-anchoring and self-competition effects with only negative traits used to evaluate the self, ingroup, and outgroup. We predicted the same effects as in Experiment 1, albeit perhaps somewhat less pronounced because of weaker initial connections between the self and negative traits. The self-anchoring prediction was again confirmed. The beta weights for the ingroup were significantly higher than the beta weights for the outgroup, which indicate that self evaluation is a better predictor for ingroup evaluation than for outgroup evaluation. This difference became even more pronounced after priming the self. Given that stronger beta weights were found not only for positive traits (Experiment 1), but now also for negative traits, this rules out an alternative explanation for self-anchoring in terms of the valence of the traits rather than their self relevance.
The novel self-competition effect was also supported in the median split analysis, where scores for the outgroup were higher for traits that received a low self evaluation score and lower for traits that received a high self evaluation score. These results support our prediction that there is an inverse relationship between the self and the outgroup. This effect was even stronger after self-priming, but only for the traits that received a high negative self rating, as predicted. Again, a similar competition effect was observed between the self and the ingroup, but only for traits that received a high self evaluation. Perhaps most importantly, we saw no effect of ingroup priming, suggesting that the self is the driving source of outgroup derogation, rather than direct ingroup versus outgroup differentiation.
SiMulaTiON
In order to demonstrate that the connectionist approach proposed by Van Rooy et al. (2003) is capable to reproduce the data we obtained, we ran simulations with their recurrent network model. Specifically, this simulation demonstrates the working of the sample-size principle in self-anchoring of the ingroup and of the self-competition principle in outgroup derogation. It is thus a kind of theoretical proof of existence, especially for the innovative self-competition effect that we introduce here. Moreover, this theoretical account is cast in a mathematical form unlike many other models in social psychology. We used exactly the same network and model parameters as Van Rooy et al. (2003, pp. 537-538; pp. 543-544, see also Van Overwalle, 2007; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005; and appendix) . As mentioned earlier in the introduction, a recurrent network consists of units that are all interconnected by bidirectional links. Each unit receives external activation (set by the modeler) and internal activation (received from other units in the net). During information uptake, external activation is spread among all other units in proportion to the weight of the connections. These weights are then modified so that the novel information is stored in the network. Consequently, each time novel information is provided, it overwrites the old information to some degree, as reflected in a learning rate parameter. For the present simulations, the learning rate was set to .20. In addition, to make meaningful statistical comparisons possible, we created some random noise by setting the initial connection weights at random values between -.10 and +.10.
sImULATIoN sPECIfICATIoNs
For the simulation of self-anchoring and self-competition, we created a network with 5 units: Three units represented the self, ingroup and outgroup targets, while the two other units denoted positive and negative traits. We then provided the net with a learning history that matched as closely as possible the experimental Note. Cell entries denote external activation and empty cell denote 0 activation; # = frequency of trial; i=internal activation is taken as external activation; ? = resulting test activations (without external activations) averaged across each row. The order of the Prior Learning trials was randomized for each simulation run ("participant"). Testing a target takes place immediately after presenting that target (after two trials) in the Priming and No Priming conditions. a Included only in the simulation of Real-life groups (see general discussion).
situation of the participants as well as their prior knowledge that they bring with them in this situation. This learning history was, of course, greatly simplified but should contain the most essential elements of our predictions (see Table 3 ). We ran this learning history with 100 different random orders for the prior learning phase, in order to simulate 100 different "participants." We describe this learning history in some more detail below. Note that in Table 3 , the number of learning "trials" or experiences is indicated by the # symbol. External activation of the respective units is indicated by the value (e.g., 1, 0.8, or 0) in the table cells. First, as can be seen in Table 3 , in a Prior Learning phase, we implemented a very condensed life-long learning experience in which people learn that some traits apply to them while other traits apply less. In particular (see first two rows), in case of a high evaluation on a self-trait, we assumed that participants would have 10 positive and 2 negative experiences (e.g., behaviors, comments by others, etc. that are relevant for this trait), while for a low self-evaluation, we assumed the reversed ratio (as indicated between parentheses in the table). Because of the co-occurrence of self and traits, these self→trait associations become stronger. In the case of a high self-evaluation, the greater number of positive traits leads to a stronger self→positive trait association, whereas the reverse is true for a low selfevaluation. The network was not trained to learn anything about minimal groups, as no relevant (i.e., positive or negative) information was provided about them in Experiments 1 and 2.
Second, in the Priming and No Priming phases, we activated the relevant target unit (e.g., self, ingroup, or outgroup), and let the activation spread so that weights were adjusted, leading to the predicted sample-size and competition effects. In the simulation, each priming trial was repeated twice for each target, to mimic the rather lengthy evaluation questionnaire procedure for priming in the real experiments. The Priming versus No Priming conditions differed by the fact that activation (i.e., priming) of the self came first or last respectively.
As can be seen in Table 3 , in the Priming condition, first the self is activated, next the ingroup, and finally the outgroup. Crucial for the simulation is that we assume that self-activation persists after the first trail, while the other groups are evaluated. Thus, after the self is activated, during subsequent evaluations of the ingroup and the outgroup, the activation of the self unit persists although to a somewhat lesser degree. This is implemented in the simulation by setting the activation of the self unit to 0.8 during subsequent trials.
In contrast, in the No Priming condition, first the ingroup and the outgroup are activated, and then the self. Consequently, there is no lasting activation of the self during evaluation of the ingroup of the outgroup. However, it is important to note that we assume that the self is an intricate part of the ingroup. As noted earlier, in fact, for minimal groups, the self is the only known member of the ingroup. Consequently, when the ingroup unit is activated, the self unit is also activated to a large degree (0.8). When the outgroup is activated, there is no lasting activation of the self (unlike the Priming condition), and the activation level of the self is 0.
Taken together, in the Priming condition (self-evaluation first), the ingroup and outgroup are activated together with a lasting effect of the self. In the No Priming condition (self-evaluation last), the ingroup is activated together with an activation of the self (as only known member), but the self is not activated when the outgroup is evaluated.
Note that to have a more realistic simulation of eliciting one's positive or negative trait evaluations, rather than hand-setting positive and negative evaluations as in the prior learning phase, we used the evaluative response of the network as learned in the Prior Learning phase, using a procedure developed by Van Overwalle and Siebler (2005, p. 238) . Evaluation was coded by capturing the internal activation spread from a target to the trait evaluations (denoted by "i" to represent "internally generated input," see Table 3 ) and "boosting" these activations further to approach the extremes of -1 (when negative) or +1 (when positive; using a standard nonlinear updating algorithm with 20 internal cycles and decay = .15, see Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005, p. 238; pp. 272-273 , and appendix for more mathematical details). This allows spreading of the activation of the target units to the trait units, and learning from it (because the additional "boosting" ensures that there is some amount of error; without such boosting there would be no error as the internal activation is exactly identical to the external activation).
Finally, after activating a target (during two trials), immediately afterwards a test of the same target was run. These test trials are shown in the bottom panel, although it should be realized that learning and testing always followed each other. Testing was done by activating each target group and reading off the resulting trait activation. An overall trait evaluation was obtained by subtracting the obtained negative trait activation from the positive trait activation. Note that consistent with the learning phases, we activated the self unit also during ingroup testing. This is crucial to obtain simulation results of the ingroup that are very similar to the self with respect to more positive evaluations when self-evaluations are high as opposed to low.
The assumption that the self is also activated when the ingroup is activated fits with a distributed approach of coding in a connectionist network, where a whole array of units represent a concept (such as a group or trait) rather than a single unit, and where similar concepts activate in part the same units, that is, their activation patterns overlap, as is the case here for self and ingroup. And indeed, a distributed representation in which each concept was represented by 10 units instead of 1 unit basically resulted in the same pattern of results (see appendix for details). We also explored an alternative representation where the ingroup is closely linked to the self (+1.0) while the outgroup is weakly linked to the self (+ 0.1), but without overlapping activation. This approach did also work (see appendix for details).
sImULATIoN REsULTs ANd dIsCUssIoN
We now present the results of the simulation with the coding of the target groups as listed in Table 3 , because this coding makes the essential assumptions and underlying working of the simulation more explicit and understandable. This model was first compared with the data of the first experiment (positive traits only) and then with the second experiment (negative traits only). As the simulation includes positive and negative traits simultaneously and tests the overall evaluation, the same model was applied on the two data sets. Figure 4 depicts the results of a simulation of Experiment 1, for each of the three targets. The simulated values of 100 simulation runs were averaged, and because of differences in scaling, these simulated values were rescaled using linear regression (with the observed data from Table 1 as independent "criterion" variable) and superimposed onto the observed data. Consequently, we obtain a similar scale and can compare the pattern of the results visually. From our simulation learning history, we predict that because the ingroup is always activated together with the self, this leads to self-anchoring or positive ingroup→trait associations under high self-evaluation and negative ingroup→trait associations given low self-evaluation. In contrast, given that the self is not part of the outgroup, the outgroup→trait associations are hardly influenced by high versus low self-evaluation, leading to basically undifferentiated outgroup→trait associations. These predictions were basically supported. As can be seen from the simulation data in Figure 4 (see dotted lines), the mean evaluations of the self (left) are much closer to the ingroup (middle) than to the outgroup (right). Specifically, the evaluations of self and ingroup differ strongly between positive and negative traits (reflecting self-anchoring), whereas the evaluations of the outgroup differentiate hardly between positive and negative traits. This general pattern of means was also captured in our experimental data (see full lines).
Experiment 1.
Furthermore, the simulation is consistent with our self-priming predictions. We predict that self-priming leads to competition of the self against the ingroup and outgroup, and thus weakens these group→trait associations. This was also corroborated by the simulation. First, the ingroup evaluations (middle panel) show the predicted self-competition pattern after self-priming, that is, decreasing evaluations for high traits and increasing evaluations for low traits. Second, the outgroup evaluations (right panel) show the same competition pattern after self-priming (decreasing for high traits and increasing for low traits). The effect of priming was significant in the simulation for all groups, ts(198) = 3.26-6.64, p < .001. These two competition results were also observed in the experimental data (see full lines).
Surprisingly, in the experimental data, we saw no priming effect on the self, that is, no increased self-evaluation (see full lines in Figure 4 which are essentially flat). We reasoned that this might have been due to quite extreme judgments of high or low traits, with little trait evaluations in between. This may cause a ceiling and floor effect after priming (it is indeed well-known that priming has the strongest effects on ambiguous material). This effect was mimicked in our simulation by taking relative extreme frequencies (10 vs. 2) during Prior Learning, so that the trait associations were quite differentiated. Under these settings, the effect of priming was not significant on the self in the simulation. (When trait associations were allowed to become somewhat less differentiated by taking, for instance 10 vs. 3 learning trials, priming effects on the self appeared, consistent with our ceiling and floor explanation). Overall, the correlation between simulated and observed data was almost perfect, r = .99, p < .001.
Experiment 2. An identical simulation using 100 novel runs was compared with the data from Experiment 2, replicating the major predicted effects. Although not all predicted effects were significant in the real data (e.g., no self-competition effect given low self-evaluation), the overall correlation with the simulated values was quite substantial, r = .97, p < .001. This indicates that the pattern of the simulation across the conditions is very similar to the pattern of observed results in the actual experiment.
In summary, the connectionist model succeeded in capturing the varying experimental designs and results by modeling the most important features of these designs. Although the learning history and experimental conditions were highly simplified, the simulations not only showed the differential mean results for ingroup and outgroup, but also the self-priming effect. Interestingly, the results demonstrate that the somewhat unexpected and counterintuitive self-competition effects against the ingroup are actually consistent with these more detailed simulations.
GENEral diSCuSSiON
This research was carried out to test a connectionist analysis of ingroup favoritism through self-anchoring and outgroup derogation through self-competition. In a minimal group context, this analysis predicted all typical results of self-anchoring, ingroup favoritism, and outgroup derogation as revealed by previous research (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Otten & Wentura, 2001 ). This earlier work was extended in several respects. First, we analyzed whether outgroup derogation was caused by direct opposition against the perceived features of the self (i.e., selfcompetition) rather than by opposition against the ingroup (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987) . Second, the causal role of the self was explored using a self-priming manipulation.
Taken together, the results of both experiments strongly support our hypotheses. We saw essentially two distinct connectionist mechanisms that drive ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation in the minimal group paradigm. First, assuming that people tend to allow greater exposure to positive information on the self (Alicke et al., 1995; Koole et al., 2001) , this leads to stronger links of the self with positive traits. Because the self is taken as primary source of evaluation of the ingroup, this self-information serves as an anchor to evaluate the ingroup, resulting in the same self-enhancing effect at the ingroup level, or ingroup favoritism. These predicted self-anchoring and ingroup favoritism effects were observed in the intraindividual regression analyses, consistent with the findings of Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) and Otten and Wentura (2001) . Second, our novel self-competition hypothesis predicts that strong self evaluations tend to block the development of similar evaluations with a distinct outgroup, leading to an inverse relation between self and outgroup evaluations. This hypothesis was confirmed in the median split analyses of the minimal group experiments.
In addition, our connectionist analysis predicted that self-priming (by evaluating the self before the groups) strengthens the connections between the self and the traits due to the additional exposure of the self and these traits. More importantly, self-priming should lead to stronger self-anchoring and self-competition effects. This was also confirmed in the two minimal group experiments.
It is interesting to note that the connectionist approach makes different predictions with respect to existing groups as opposed to minimal groups. Due to a greater familiarity with real groups, ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are less driven by self-anchoring and self-competition, but rather by prior knowledge and experience about the groups themselves (see Table 3 for a simulation). These claims are supported by a meta-analysis by Robbins and Krueger (2005) , who demonstrated that real groups reveal less self-anchoring. Moreover, in a realgroup experiment that we also conducted, both less self-anchoring and self-competition was found, although the outgroup was evaluated less positively than the self and the ingroup. Thus, in real group settings, ingroup and outgroup biases are perhaps more an effect of self and ingroup enhancement bias, as put forward by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) , and also observed in minimal group situations (Tajfel et al., 1971) . Although Otten (2004) found a self-anchoring effect in a real group experiment, it is unclear from her analyses whether this is due to a mere positivity-contagion effect or a real anchoring effect, since no comparison was made between the predictive power of self-traits and trait valence. Nevertheless, her findings suggest that the boundary conditions for the emergence of selfanchoring in a real group context should be further explored.
Although our main results are consistent with the conclusions from the review by Robbins and Krueger (2005) , these authors made two observations that contradict our results. First, they conclude that outgroup projection (projection of features of the self onto the outgroup) is small but positive, whereas we found evidence for outgroup competition instead. This incongruency is most probably due to the specific experiments included in the review. Twenty-five experiments were real group experiments, and among the 23 laboratory experiments were several variations on the minimal group design. For example, in the second study of Krueger and Clement (1996) , we surmise that the use of positive category names such as "rational-intuitive" and "cognitive-empathic" as well as a vague personality sketch, resulted in rather positive descriptions of the ingroup and outgroup, leading to positive so-called self-"projection" on these groups.
Second, Robbins and Krueger (2005) observed that the order of evaluations did not affect the strength of self-anchoring whereas we predicted and found stronger effects when the self evaluation is made before the ingroup evaluation. Again, we warn against collapsing across familiar and minimal groups. In fact, several experiments with minimal groups support our conclusions (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger & Clement, 1996) . Moreover, in a real group setting, the saliency of the self and the involved groups may reach higher initial levels, causing the effect of evaluation order to be minimal.
Taken together, our data suggest that our broad connectionist framework is able to explain all relevant effects of self-anchoring and self-competition in a minimal group context. This connectionist perspective explains ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation in terms of learning principles widely applied in many domains of psychology, without recourse to idiosyncratic ad-hoc hypotheses that are much more limited in their scope. In addition, it views outgroup derogation as mainly caused by self-competition, or the blocking of outgroup features that are already high for the self. An additional contribution of this model is that it extends previous explanations of ingroup favoritism (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Otten, 2002) with a mechanism that explains the order effects caused by varying the order of evaluations in this paradigm.
It should be noted that the present connectionist analysis can be applied also on other measures of group biases, such as response time measurements or classic allocation tasks in the minimal group paradigm. Allocation tasks are perhaps best compared with the same type of testing procedure as in the present simulations. However, response times are probably better tested with a different simulation procedure, whereby the number of internal cycles to settle into a stable activation is compared with the time needed to arrive at an answer (see also Van Rooy et al., 2003) . If response time reflects the speed by which participants come to an unambiguous answer, then the time to settle to a stable activation level might be a more adequate comparison.
Since this connectionist model successfully explained other biases in the areas of group impression formation (illusory correlation), group differentiation (accentuation), stereotype change (dispersed versus concentrated distribution of inconsistent information), and group homogeneity (Van Rooy et al., 2003) , the present research program encourages exploring other capacities of this connectionist approach. For instance, it seems very plausible to explain the ingroup projection effect--where an ingroup shapes the perceptions of a superordinate group (e.g., Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003) --by the same connectionist mechanism. Ingroup projection can be seen as the projection of ingroup features into an inclusive superordinate category and derogation of a related outgroup, which is also part of this superordinate category. Both effects can be parsimoniously explained by connectionist mechanisms analogous to self-anchoring and self-competition respectively.
To conclude, it appears that the self is an important factor in forming impressions about novel groups. When we have very little information about an ingroup and an outgroup, we tend to project our own positive features onto this ingroup and we tend to attribute contrastive features to the outgroup (unlike alternative proposals that see an inverse causal role of the self, namely, that we contrast our own features away from an outgroup to obtain ingroup favoritism--e.g., Sherif, 1966) . Because these self-anchoring and self-competition mechanisms may not be as strong in familiar groups, the obvious question then is what sources perpetuate these biases in real groups? Based on our results, we suggest that self-anchoring and self-competition play an important role in the initial exploratory stages when people become members of a novel group, and that ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are reinforced by selective search and filtering of information about the ingroup and outgroup that confirm these initial group biases. Future research could benefit by focusing on all these determinants of categorization in real groups.
appENdix bAsICs of THE sImULATIoNs
The simulations were run with an auto-associative network as used in Van Rooy et al. (2003) , where all units are interconnected with each other, leading to different weights in each direction. We used similar networks, settings, and parameters as in earlier simulations of social phenomena like group biases (Van Rooy et al., 2003) , person impression formation (Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004) , and attitude formation (Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005 ; see also Van Overwalle, 2007) . Processing information takes place in two phases. In the first phase, the activation of the units is computed, and in the second phase, the weights of the connections are updated (see also McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) .
Unit Activation. During the first phase of information processing, each unit in the network receives activation from external sources, termed ext i . This activation is then spread throughout the network along the connections where it influences all other units. The activation coming from the other units is called the internal input, termed int i . In mathematical terms, the internal input is the sum of the activation from the other units j (denoted by a j ) in proportion to the weight of their connection, or int i = Σ (a j * w ij ), (1) for all j ≠ i. Typically, activations and weights range between -1 to +1. The external input and internal input are then summed to determine the net internal activation, or net i = E * ext i + I * int i , (2) where E and I reflect the degree to which the net input is determined by the external and internal input respectively. In a recurrent network, the activation of each unit i is updated during a number of cycles until it eventually converges to a stable pattern that reflects the network's short-term memory. In the present simulations, we used only a single internal updating cycle (see also Van Rooy et al., 2003; Van Overwalle, 2007; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) . This was done to maintain a strong competition effect, like in feedforward connectionist networks or associative learning models (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . According to the linear activation algorithm used in the simulations, the updating of activation is governed by the following equation:
where D reflects a memory decay term.
Weight Updating. After this first phase, the auto-associative model enters in its second learning phase, where the short-term activation is consolidated in longterm weight changes. These weight changes are driven by the discrepancy between the internal and external input, formally expressed in the delta algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988, p. 166) : (4) where ∆w ij is the change in the weight of the connection from unit j to i, ε is a learning rate that determines how fast the network learns, and a j is the activation of unit j. In the simulations, the weights of the connections were updated after each trial. At the end of each simulation, the judgment of interest was tested by turning on the external activation of the appropriate target units and reading off the resulting activation of the trait units (see also Table 3 ).
Generating Trait Activations. Most standard connectionist models require external input to learn form their errors in prediction, as explained above. However, this makes it difficult to use internal responses such as needs, emotions, and evaluations (in attitude formation, see Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) or self-evaluations (in this article) for learning. One solution applied by Van Overwalle and Siebler (2005) , is to use this internal prediction anyway, and boost it so that it creates some error and learning takes place. Specifically, to spontaneously generate the trait responses learned in the prior training phase, the internal activation at the trait units (indicated by "i" in Table 3 ) is taken as external activation and further "boosted" in order to allow for further learning. First, the internal activation arriving at the trait units is computed as usual by Equation 1. Next, this internal activation is further "boosted" toward the extremes of +1 and -1 by running 20 times the standard nonlinear activation updating algorithm from recurrent networks. In mathematical terms, where D = .15 reflecting a memory decay term as before. The resulting activation a i is then taken as external activation of the trait unit in the simulation.
mAIN sImULATIoNs ANd vARIANTs
Main Simulations. As noted in the text, the parameters for the main simulations were learning rate ε = .20 and starting weights randomly drawn between -.1 and +.1. There was only one internal updating cycle with parameter values D = I = E = 1. Given these simplifying assumptions, the internal activation of unit i reduces simply to the sum of the external and internal input, or a i = net i = ext i + int i .
Distributed Simulations. In the distributed simulations, each concept was represented by 10 units instead of 1. Given that this also distributes the weight adjustments among these units, the learning rate was reduced accordingly to ε = .03. For each set of 10 "participants," external activation was drawn randomly from a normal distribution with as mean the activation values in Table 3 and standard deviation 0.1. Starting weights were set to zero. All other parameters were identical as before. The correlation of this simulation with the experimental data in Figure  4 was r = .98, p < .001.
Self-Link Simulations. In these simulations, the connection weight between the ingroup unit and the self was fixed to +1, while the weight between the outgroup and self was fixed to +0.1. A non-distributed coding was used as in Table 3 , although, crucially, the self unit was never activated when the ingroup was activated, except in the priming first condition were the self unit was activated (to a +0.8 level, but a +1 level works as well) in the presence of the ingroup or the outgroup to reflect persisting priming effects. In order for the activation coming from these fixed self-connections to reach other units, there were now 2 internal activation cycles instead of 1. Given that this generally increases activation levels in the network, the learning rate was accordingly reduced to ε = .05. All other parameters were identical as in the main simulations. The correlation of this simulation with the data in Figure 4 was r = .97, p < .001.
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